Hi. I’m Ted Crackel and I’m the new Editor in Chief of the Papers of George Washington. I’m delighted to be here and look forward to meeting all of you in the months and years ahead.

Since many of you do not know me let me say something about my background. I have a B.A. in history from the University of Illinois and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Rutgers University. My books have included *Mr. Jefferson’s Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801–1809* and *West Point: A Bicentennial History*. Before coming here I was the director and editor of a wholly digital project—*Papers of the War Department 1784–1800*—at East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania. One thing making that project special was that the usual collection of documents that a project works with was, in that case, destroyed in a fire in 1800. The job there was to reconstitute those records—locating surviving copies of documents that likely would have been in the War Office at the time of the fire. To date that project has located nearly 50,000 such documents.

I arrived at the University of Virginia the last day of August 2004. I am pleased to be here and to head such a truly professional staff. Our editors are the world’s leading experts on the life and times of George Washington. My goal is to see that both the high standards set in place so many years ago and the steady pace of production are maintained. They are, and will continue to be, the hallmark of the project. Volume 12 of the *Presidential Series* (Christine Patrick, lead editor, and John Pinheiro, junior editor) was issued in late January 2005. Volume 15 of the *Revolutionary War Series* (Ed Lengel, editor) is at the Press, and Volume 16 (David Hoth, editor) will be sent to the Press in May. When Hoth’s volume goes to the Press he will move to the *Presidential Series*. That will give us two editors in each series—Patrick and Hoth in the Presidency, and Phil Chase and Lengel in the Revolutionary War.

As you might expect, there will be a few small changes in forthcoming volumes. The first will be the addition of a brief introduction in the front matter of each volume that will discuss the events and persons that most occupied Washington’s att-
A Fondness for Fish

For all the fine china, silver, glassware, and furniture that George Washington purchased during his lifetime for his dining room at Mount Vernon and the dining rooms of the presidential mansions in which he lived, no one ever accused him of being a gourmet. His adopted grandson, George
Washington Parke Custis, says in his *Recollections and Private Memoirs of Washington* that his grandfather's breakfast menu was invariably “Indian [cornmeal] cakes, honey, and tea” (p. 166). The other meal of the day, dinner, was served in mid-afternoon. “Precisely at a quarter before three,” Custis writes, “the industrious farmer [Washington] always returned [to the Mount Vernon mansion], dressed, and dined at three o’clock. At this meal he ate heartily, but was not particular in his diet, with exception of fish, of which he was excessively fond. He partook sparingly of desert, drank a home-made beverage, and from four to five glasses of Maderia wine” (p. 169).

Having dined often with his grandfather as a boy in the 1780s and 1790s, George Washington Parke Custis is perhaps as good a witness regarding Washington's diet as one could hope to find. One is given pause, however, by the fact that Custis wrote his *Recollections* long after Washington's death, looking back through the haze of nineteenth-century sentimentality and generally endeavoring to preserve and enhance Washington’s mythical status as the father of his country. Is there a way to check the accuracy of Custis’s memory about specific factual details?

Fortunately, in the case of Washington’s liking of fish, there is. On March 29, 1777, when Washington was in winter quarters with the Continental army at Morristown, N.J., he wrote a personal note to the president of the Continental Congress, John Hancock, in which he says: “General Washington presents his complim’ts & grateful thanks to Mr. Hancock for his valuable present of Fish . . . nothing could be more acceptable. The Genl. tho’ exceeding fond of Salt Fish, is happy enough never to think of it unless it is placed before him, for which reason it would give him concern if Mr. Hancock should put himself to the least trouble in forwarding any to Camp on his Acc’t” (*Revolutionary War Series*, 9:11, source note).

This predilection may have become more widely known, for Washington received several gifts of fish—both salted and fresh—as commander in chief and as president (see, for instance, James Wilkinson to GW, 1 Nov. 1792, in *Presidential Series*, 11:319–20, and GW to Wilkinson, 14 Mar. 1793, ibid., 12:320–21).

Washington’s self-confessed fondness for salt fish makes great practical sense in two ways. First, it was a readily available food at Mount Vernon, where nearly every spring thousands of herring and shad were netted in the Potomac River and packed with salt in large barrels for use on the plantation and for sale both locally and abroad. Second, Washington’s well known dental problems and the loss of nearly all of his teeth by the time he became president undoubtedly made soft foods like fish and cornmeal cakes with honey particularly palatable to him.

In addition, Washington’s dining habits reflected both his inner character and the image that he projected to the public eye. The elegance of Washington's dining room and eating utensils conveyed to his guests at Mount Vernon his high status in Virginia society, and in the presidential mansions at New York and Philadelphia they conveyed the prestige of the presidency that he worked so hard to establish. Washington's personal diet, however, can be viewed as an outward sign—perhaps unconsciously communicated—of the inner Spartan self-control that he had developed during his youth to survive the many dangers and privations to which he was exposed as a frontier surveyor and soldier. The salt fish of which Washington was so fond was a food more commonly associated with the lower ranks of society than with the aristocracy—a food often used to sustain the slaves and enlisted men that he commanded. And even this very prosaic pleasure was subject to iron control. He did not even allow himself “to think of it,” he was quick to tell John Hancock, unless it was “placed before him.”

Fortunately for Americans, Washington instinctively exercised the same control over his appetite for political power as he did his appetite for food. “I can . . . with truth declare,” he wrote to Hancock a few days before the Battle of Trenton in December 1776, “that I have no lust after power but wish with as much fervency as any man upon this wide extended Continent for an Opportunity of turning the Sword into a ploughshare” (*Revolutionary War Series*, 7:382). Although it took Washington much longer than he anticipated or desired to turn his sword into a ploughshare,
his ability to use power without abusing it was indispensable to the success of the American Revolution long after the guns of war were stilled.

—Philander D. Chase

George Muse (1720–1790)

It is not the lot of great men to always deal only with other great men, and perhaps that was more true during the time when George Washington lived than at the present. George Muse, an Englishman who first crossed Washington’s path in the 1740s, certainly was not a great or a noble man, and that he was a contrary one, at least where Washington was concerned, and given to alcohol, cannot be disputed, although he might not have been the perfect scoundrel that some regarded him as after his apparently cowardly behavior at the capitulation of Fort Necessity in July 1754. Though he was not cut from the same cloth as Lord Dunmore or Benedict Arnold or even Charles Lee, three other men who provoked Washington’s ire, he nevertheless disgusted Washington as few others ever did.

Muse, who was Washington’s senior by twelve years, had been among the Virginia troops, including Washington’s half brother Lawrence, who served in the Cartagena campaign of 1741. He subsequently became deputy adjutant general under Lawrence for the Virginia colony, taking upon himself the duties of adjutant general during the illness that finally took Lawrence’s life in 1752. He was already a captain in the provincial forces when Virginia lieutenant governor Robert Dinwiddie decided to make him major on the 1753 expedition against the French on the Ohio. He afterward served under Washington as a captain, major, and lieutenant colonel in the first Virginia Regiment.

Of his infamous behavior at the capitulation of Fort Necessity, one report said Muse “instead of bringing up the 2d division to make the Attack with the first, he marched them or rather frightened them back into the trenches,” a move exposing the Carolina Independent Company to French fire and forcing them to fall back also. Another report denounced Muse for halting his troops and running them “back in the utmost Confusion. happy he that could get into the Fort first.” Washington omitted Muse’s name when praising his officers and men in his report to Dinwiddie, as did the House of Burgesses when making an address thanking the officers for their role. One of the four officers in the Virginia Regiment wounded at Fort Necessity, William La Péronie, a Frenchman who was killed the following year in Braddock’s defeat, informed Washington from Williamsburg that many had enquired of him “about Muses Braveries; poor Body I had pity him ha’nt he had the weakness to Confes his Coardise him self, & the inpdulence to taxe all the reste of the oficers without exeption of the same imperfection. for he said to many of the Cousulars and Burgeses that he was Bad But th’ the reste was as Bad as he.” To speak “francly,” declared La Péronie, “had I been in town at the time I Coun’t help’d to make use of my horse’s wheup for to vindicate the injury of that vilain.” Furthermore, Muse had “Contrived his Business” so that several men in Williamsburg had asked La Péronie if it were true that Muse had challenged Washington to a “fight: my answer was no other But that he Should rather chuse to go to hell than doing of it. for had he had such thing declar’d: that was his Sure Road—I have made my particular Business to tray if any had some Bad intention against you here Below: But thank God I meet allowais with a goad wish for you from evry mouth each one entertining such Caracter of you as I have the honour to do my Self.”

No, Washington was not thought badly of by anyone because of Muse. Muse himself, however, was universally accused of cowardice and resigned his commission, moving Dinwiddie to remark that, “as he is not very agreeable to the other Officers, I am well pleas’d at his resignatn.” But the world was smaller then, and that was not the end of Washington’s association with Muse. Two years later Muse was a colonel of the militia and as such attended councils of war in Winchester to consider the defense of the frontier. Muse then disappears from Washington’s records until one snowy evening in January 1768 when he came to Mount Vernon with Washington’s brother Charles and the supplier for the Virginia Regiment in 1754 and 1755, Charles Dick, for what turned into a week of playing cards.
Muse’s resignation might have pleased Dinwiddie, but it also prevented Muse from losing any of the bounty land promised to him as an officer under Dinwiddie’s Proclamation of 1754—15,000 acres—to the consternation of some. In August 1770 he agreed to convey one-third of it to Washington if the latter would pay all the costs arising from the “Surveying and securing” of the land. Thus when a patent was issued to Muse for 3,323 acres the following November, Washington was owner of one-third, and he secured the rest of the property by exchanging it for 2,000 acres that he purchased from across the Kanawha River. In March 1771 Muse attended a meeting of former officers of the original Virginia Regiment to hear Washington’s report about his trip to examine the lands lying on the Kanawha River that had been allotted to the officers.

When the acreage was finally approved by the council, Muse apparently concluded that he had been shortchanged and somehow threw the blame upon Washington in an “impertinent Letter” written in December 1773. The letter has not survived, but Washington’s acerbic response, written in late January 1774, has. “As I am not accustomed to receive such from any Man,” Washington wrote, “nor would have taken the same language from you personally, without letting you feel some marks of my resentment; I would advise you to be cautious in writing me a second of the same tenour; for though I understand you were drunk when you did it, yet give me leave to tell you, that drunkenness is no excuse for rudeness.” Except for Muse’s “stupidity & sottishness,” said Washington, he might have read in the newspapers that 10,000 acres of land had been approved for him. “& all my concerns is, that I ever engag’d in behalf of so ungrateful & dirty a fellow as you are. . . . I wrote to you a few days ago concerning the other distribution, proposing an easy method of dividing our Lands; but since I find in what temper you are, I am sorry I took the trouble of mentioning the Land, or your name in a Letter, as I do not think you merit the least assistance from G: Washington.”

Despite Washington’s anger, he and Muse carried through on their previous agreement concerning the land swap. Muse turned over his interest in the property to his son Battaile Muse in January 1775. Muse married Elizabeth Battaile (d. 1786) in 1749 and settled in Caroline County, and Battaile Muse (1751–1803), who settled in Berkeley County, was rental agent for Washington’s western lands in the 1780s.

—Frank E. Grizzard

The Battle of Monmouth
28 June 1778

Historians often point to the Battle of Monmouth as one of GW’s finest military moments. It also has been seen as the pivotal moment at which Continental soldiers first proved themselves the equals of the British redcoats. But it was a close-run thing. On this atrociously hot day in central New Jersey, American and British soldiers marched and fought, sometimes hand-to-hand, for several hours until dozens of them fell dead of wounds or became delirious from heat exhaustion. Positions changed hands several times, and both sides flirted with victory and defeat. At one point, American soldiers rampaged through the British baggage train while Sir Henry Clinton’s army seemingly reeled in disarray; at another, a bayonet charge by Lord Cornwallis’s redcoats routed half of the American army and came close to sweeping GW’s entire force from the field. In the end, it took the timely intervention of the commander in chief and a little luck to save the day.

The road to the Battle of Monmouth began on 18 June with the evacuation of Clinton’s British and German army from Philadelphia, which it had occupied since the previous September. Clinton’s objective was to march east and northeast across New Jersey to Sandy Hook, where a fleet of transports waited to carry his troops to New York. GW, camped with his army at Valley Forge, Pa., since December 1777, sent a detachment under Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold to reoccupy Philadel-
phia and followed Clinton at a discreet distance with the rest of his army.

GW wanted to come to grips with Clinton's army, but the care with which the British marched, keeping their baggage to the front and their best troops screening their flanks and rear, made it difficult to see how that could be accomplished. For several days GW shadowed Clinton across central New Jersey, ordering militia and light infantry to burn bridges, conduct raids, and otherwise obstruct the British advance. These tactics and the increasingly brutal heat took their toll on the British column, which frayed at the edges as dozens and then hundreds of stragglers and deserters crept away. But time was running out, and as the British inched toward Sandy Hook GW became impatient to close with the enemy. His generals opposed him at first, urging caution and insisting that the Continentals should keep their distance lest Clinton lure them into a trap. Finally, on 24 June, Major Generals Nathanael Greene and Lafayette suggested sending a small force of 2,500 men to follow the British more closely and look for opportunities to attack any straggling enemy detachments. GW welcomed this plan and expanded it by increasing the detachment's size to 4,000; with subsequent accretions it reached 5,000 troops, about half the American army. GW's advance detachment was larger than necessary for a raid but not strong enough to face a determined British counterattack.

Command of the force fell to Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, who did not agree with GW's plans but insisted on his right of precedence over the commander in chief's first choice, Lafayette. By the evening of 27 June, Lee had led his force to Enlishtown, a few miles west of the British camp at Monmouth Court House (also called Freehold), a small village of about 40 houses situated at a major crossroads. The terrain that surrounded the village was easily defensible. One mile north of the courthouse, between the roads leading to Middletown and Perth Amboy, was a stretch of rough, boggy land known as the East Ravine. To the west, the road from the courthouse to Englishtown traversed two miles of woods, fields, and thick underbrush before crossing the Middle Ravine. From there the road continued west for about another mile and entered the marshy West Ravine, where it crossed Wemrock Brook over a bridge. South of the Middle and West Ravines was more rough terrain, where hills alternated with streams and bogs. GW ordered Lee to attack the British the next morning, promising to hurry to his support with the rest of the army but giving Lee no specific instructions on how to proceed.

Clinton's army began leaving Monmouth in two divisions in the early morning of 28 June. The first division, composed of about 4,000 troops and the baggage train under Gen. Knyphausen, stirred between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. and marched northeast on the road to Middletown. The second division, numbering 6,000 mostly British troops under Clinton and Cornwallis, followed in the same direction at about 5:00 a.m. Knyphausen's vanguard marched five miles during the next four hours, but his baggage train was still straggling all the way back to Monmouth Court House when the "two or three hundred Men" of the New Jersey militia that Maj. Gen. Philemon Dickinson had sent "to amuse and detain" the British bounded out of the East Ravine onto the Middletown Road at 9:00 a.m. The Americans plundered some wagons before Knyphausen's soldiers drove them off.

Maj. Gen. Charles Lee's detachment of 5,000 men meanwhile decamped from Enlishtown at about 7:00 a.m. and marched southeast, crossing the West and Middle Ravines before leaving the road and marching east across country. Lee's troops then crossed the Perth Amboy Road and continued marching east along the East Ravine, leaving Monmouth Court House to the south. By midmorning Lee's troops, who had struggled through the countryside in temperatures approaching 100 degrees, were arrayed in a haphazard line facing the Briar Hill Road, with the East Ravine to their left rear and Monmouth Court House to their right rear. Here they joined elements of Dickinson's militia and probed the British covering force, which by this time consisted of three infantry brigades. Lee toyed with a number of methods of dislodging the enemy and sparred with them ineffectually for about two hours before attempting a complicated pincers movement that would, he hoped, cut off the entire British rearguard. But it was not to be. His units became
hopelessly entangled as they advanced, and eventually had to break off the attack. By then Knyphausen’s division and the baggage train had scurried out of range down the Middletown Road, and Clinton had assembled Cornwallis’s entire division of 6,000 men to face Lee. As the British advanced at about 1:00 p.m., some American units tried to reposition themselves; but their movements were mistaken for withdrawals by other units, which responded by retreating in earnest. Soon the entire force was in flight, with Lee unable to control them.

Lee’s force retreated southwest through Monmouth Court House and then west along the Englishtown Road. The American force became further dispersed in the process, and by the time it reached the Middle Ravine Maj. Gen. Lafayette and Brigadier Generals Charles Scott and Anthony Wayne led their commands more or less independently, without paying much regard to Lee. Indeed, Scott and Wayne were so angry with Lee that they avoided speaking to him. Cornwallis’s troops pursued, but the mid-afternoon heat enervated them so badly that it was all they could do to keep up.

GW spent the morning marching from Penclopen towards Monmouth Court House with his own force of 6,000 troops, arranged in two divisions under Major Generals Stirling and Nathanael Greene. Just before he reached the West Ravine, GW received inaccurate intelligence of a possible flanking movement to his right, and to meet it he ordered Greene to file off in that direction before continuing east. As GW resumed the advance he encountered the first signs of Lee’s retreat in the form of some panic-stricken stragglers fleeing toward Englishtown. Soon he met Lee and demanded the meaning of the retreat. Lee hesitated, stammered, and then tried to justify himself by blaming poor intelligence and the failure of his troops to heed his commands. He also reminded GW that he had not endorsed the attack on Clinton in the first place. Legend says that GW reacted by bitterly cursing Lee until the leaves shook on the trees; more likely, GW kept his voice under control but embarrassed the general with a few acid remarks on his failure to follow orders and control his troops.

GW crossed the West Ravine, ordered Wayne to deploy the 3d Maryland and 3d Pennsylvania Regiments as a rearguard in a nearby copse, and then returned and told Lee to join Wayne with whatever troops he could muster. Stirling’s division and Brig. Gen. Henry Knox’s artillery meanwhile took up positions on the western slopes of the ravine while Greene’s division occupied Comb’s Hill about seven hundred yards to the south. It took an hour of heavy fighting for Clinton to drive Lee and Wayne from their positions, but by mid-afternoon the remainder of Lee’s detachment had retreated across the bridge that spanned the West Ravine. GW ordered Lee to take his battered force back to Englishtown.

After an artillery duel that lasted about two hours, Clinton launched an attack across the West Ravine in the late afternoon. But the Americans were well entrenched, and after a fight that sawed back and forth across the ravine for an hour or so the troops were back in their original positions. An attempt by Cornwallis to dislodge Greene from Comb’s Hill likewise ended in an impasse. By 6:00 p.m. both sides were exhausted, and Clinton withdrew his troops half a mile in order to stay out of range of the American artillery. GW spent the night under a cloak next to Lafayette, with whom he discussed plans to attack in
the morning. But at midnight Clinton’s troops left their campfires burning and withdrew toward Middletown. By sunrise on 29 June the British were well on the road to Middletown and Sandy Hook, N.J., where they began embarking for New York City on 1 July.

A modern estimate based on contemporary sources puts American casualties at 69 killed, 161 wounded, and 95 missing, along with 37 dead of heatstroke, against Clinton’s official report of 147 killed, 170 wounded, and 64 missing, a figure that apparently did not include Germans (Peckham, *Toll of Independence*, 52). Both sides claimed victory, but although British casualties were slightly higher, the Battle of Monmouth is probably best described as a draw. GW’s pre-battle dispositions had been faulty at best, and his decision to entrust command of the advance force to Lee, who opposed any attack, rather than to Lafayette, who advocated an aggressive pursuit of the British, was a serious mistake. Yet there is no question that GW’s timely intervention at the height of the battle helped to turn the tide. The battle’s finest laurels nevertheless undoubtedly belong to the American Continentals, who had proven that they could stand toe to toe with Britain’s best.

—Edward G. Lengel

**Washington Begins His Second Term**

The recently published volume 12 of the Presidential Series covers the end of Washington’s first term in office and the beginning of his second. Recognizing the importance of precedents in the new nation, Congress established a joint committee in February 1793 “to report a mode of examining the votes for President & Vice-President . . . and for regulating the time, place & manner of administering the Oath of Office to the President” (Conversation with a Joint Committee of Congress, Feb. 9, 1793).

While the procedure for counting the electoral votes and notifying the winners of the results was quickly decided, the process for administering the oath of office a second time required more discussion as “no mode is pointed out by the constitution or law.” The congressional committee apparently left this decision for Washington to decide, and he therefore summoned the members of his cabinet to a meeting on February 28 to discuss the possibilities (Washington to Cabinet, Feb. 27, 1793). Henry Knox, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Edmund Randolph agreed that William Cushing, an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, should administer the oath, but “T.J. and A.H. think, that it ought to be in private,” while “H.K. and E.R.” believed it should "be in public; and that the Marshal of the district [Clement Biddle] should prepare the house of Representatives for the purpose (Cabinet Opinion, Feb. 28, 1793). During a subsequent cabinet meeting on Friday, March 1, Hamilton changed his mind and supported a public ceremony. The cabinet determined that the Senate chamber was the appropriate site, it “being the usual place for the president's public acts.” It also decided that Washington should go and return from the ceremony “without form,” that is, without any formal procession (Cabinet Opinion, Mar. 1, 1793). After the meeting, GW sent a circular letter asking the senators to convene in their chamber on the following Monday (Circular to the U.S. Senators, Mar. 1, 1793). Following the original Constitutional requirement that the administration of the presidential oath occur on the first Monday in March, Washington went to the Senate chamber on March 4, 1793. Before taking the oath, he gave those present in the Senate chamber what is still the shortest inaugural address in U. S. history:

“FELLOW-CITIZENS: I am again called upon, by the voice of my country, to execute the functions of its Chief Magistrate. When the occasion proper for it shall arrive, I shall endeavour to express the high sense I entertain of this distinguished honor, and of the confidence which has been reposed in me by the people of United America.

“Previous to the execution of any official act of the PRESIDENT, the Constitution requires an oath of office. This oath I am now about to take, and in your presence; that if it shall be found, during my administration of the Government, I have in any instance, violated, willingly or knowingly, the injunction thereof, I may (besides incurring Constitutional punishment) be subject to the upbraidings of all who are now witnesses of the present
solemn ceremony.”

The Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia) reported on March 6 that Washington withdrew from the Senate chambers after the oath “as he had come, without pomp or ceremony; but on his departure from the House, the people could no longer refrain obeying the genuine dictates of their hearts, and they saluted him with three cheers.”

One of the more pressing problems for Washington at the start of his second term was the challenge of keeping the United States from becoming entangled in the expanding war in Europe. France’s declaration of war against Great Britain on February 1, 1793, and the subsequent threats by both nations to American shipping made Washington’s task difficult, as did the attempts by the French minister Edmond Genet to persuade the federal government and private American citizens to support the French war effort. Nevertheless, Washington was determined to maintain the neutral status of the United States, and to clarify the U.S. position, he issued the Neutrality Proclamation on April 22, 1793:

“WHEREAS it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great-Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other, the duty and interest of the United States require, that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers:

“I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the disposition of the United States to ob-serve the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respectively; and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatso[e]ver, which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.

“And I do hereby also make known that whosoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles, which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States, against such punishment or forfeiture: and further, that I have given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the Law of Nations, with respect to the powers at war, or any of them.

“In Testimony Whereof I have caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the city of Philadelphia, the twenty-second day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the seventeenth.”

This proclamation, however, was only the beginning of an emerging policy on American neutrality that would occupy much of the administration’s attention during the first year of Washington’s second term. During the remainder of 1793, the administration struggled to define and enforce the rights of neutral nations; to clarify the rights of French and British privateers, and their prizes, in American ports and waters; and to prevent American citizens from enlisting in the service of foreign nations at war. They also decided to ask for the recall of the French minister Edmond Genet. American neutrality therefore will be a critical subject addressed in forthcoming volumes of the Presidential Series.

—Christine Sternberg Patrick
Forthcoming Books

On June 7, 2005, Random House will publish Edward G. Lengel’s new book, General George Washington: A Military Life. This comprehensive study (the first detailed examination of GW the soldier since the nineteenth century) draws on the collections of the Papers of George Washington to chronicle the great man’s military career from the French and Indian War in the 1750s to the Quasi-War in the 1790s. Lengel, an associate editor at the project, describes GW’s early experiences at Jumonville’s Glen, Fort Necessity, and Braddock’s defeat in 1754–55, discussing his development as a soldier and his founding of America’s first professional military force, the Virginia Regiment. The bulk of the book concentrates on the Revolutionary War, in which Lengel shows how GW overcame his shortcomings as a battlefield commander to win the war through a combination of courage, determination, political savvy, and plain hard work. He closes with a chapter on the Quasi-War of 1798–99, in which GW interrupted his comfortable retirement at Mount Vernon to take command of America’s army in case of an invasion by France. The book is illustrated and includes fifteen original maps by cartographer Rick Britton. Joe Ellis, author of His Excellency: George Washington, says that “Lengel’s book now tops the list as the most comprehensive and authoritative study of Washington’s military career ever written.” Don Higginbotham, Dowd Professor of History at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, comments: “Ed Lengel knows the Washington military papers as have few historians, past or present. His study of Washington’s career as a soldier is a model of clarity and judicious analysis. It deserves a wide readership.” Publisher’s Weekly has given it a starred review and called it an “outstanding work.”

♦♦♦♦♦


Staff News


Christine S. Patrick presented Congressman Virgil Goode (Va., 5th District) with volume 12 of the Presidential Series on March 16, 2005. Ted Crackel and Max J. Evans, executive director of the National Historic Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC), also attended the meeting, during which they stressed the importance of documentary editing to preserving our nation’s history.


In July 2004, Philander D. Chase and Christine S. Patrick gave presentations on “Editing the Papers of George Washington” to the Monticello-Stratford Hall Summer Seminar for Teachers.

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